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Bartle by: Melville's Willful Renunciation? 
Owen McGrann '03 
Like so much of the work of Franz Kafka, Herman 
Mehille 's "Bart.leby" nearly defies coherent criticism. Work-
ing on a level that is both abstract and allegorical, Melville 
forged "Bart.leby" out of a tremendous number of ideas, leav-
ing the reader with a story that can be read in a great variety 
of ways, many ·of these readings contradictory and disso-
nant. Laced throughout "Bartleby" are plotiines having to 
do with Northern Slavery, supposed self-discovery (by the 
lawyer- which is ridiculous), a parable of the absurd, a story 
of unrelenting pessimism, an ex:periment in narration, and a 
lesson in why timidity is poor business practice. Perhaps the 
most ambiguous tirread in "Bartleby" is the strange dialectic 
occurring between determinism and free will. At best, Melville 
hints at the possibility of tilis philosopllical reading; how-
ever, the tex-t is loaded with commentary on ti1e subject. One 
could even claim that "Bartleby" is a parable of 
Schopenhauerian asceticism and an anticipation of Sisyphus, 
Camus' absurd hero. Tilis paper will be an examination of this 
tension between determinism and free will with the ultimate 
purpose of attempting to locate a synthesis to tllis seemingly 
uncompromising dialectic. 
It is an understatement to say that Bartleby is a 
rather eccentric character. From the first description we get of 
him it is clear that he is an anomaly. "In answer to my adver-
tisement, a motionless young man one morning stood upon 
my office threshold. the door being open, for it was summer. 
I can see ti1at figure now - pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, 
incurably forlorn! It was Bart.leby" (Melville 9). Talk about a 
bizarre way to describe a person! The adjectives - neat, re-
spectable, and forlorn - are not out of the ordinary, but the 
syntactically odd adverbs are quite strange for a fi-rst impres-
sion: pallidly, pitiably, incurably .. Already we are given the 
impression that Bart.leby has some type of illness - some-
tiling that begs the question of how fue narrator came to tllis 
conclusion on first sight (and further begs fue question of 
the narrator's authenticity, which will be examined later). 
Irrunediately Bart.leby is distinguished from tlle other 
employees by having his desk situated on ti1e attorney's 
side of the division in the office. His desk was placed there 
"so as to have tllis quiet man within easy call, in case any 
trifling thing was to be done" (9). Initially, Bart.leby was an 
exemplary employee who was "cheerfully industrious" (9). 
· Before long fue lawyer gets fue first indications tllat even if 
ti1ere were "trifling things" to be done, Bartleby would not be 
the one doing fuem. We are introduced to Bartleby's favorite 
word: prefer. Asked to proofread some copying he had done, 
Bartleby calmly replies that he "would prefer not to." The 
choice of verb is deliberate (as soon becomes evident by the 
repeated use) - prefer. Not once does Bartleby say he "will" 
not he completely avoids the use of the verb "to be." This 
. linguistic clue as to what's going on inside Bart.leby is one of 
fue few clues we have into his actual mental state. In the 
entirety of tlle story, Bartleby makes only one active action -
he shows up and applies for ti1e open position. From this 
point we find Bartleby quickly retreating from this position 
into himself. Bartleby's only actions (after this first one) are 
all reactions- he never once begins conversation, he never 
once asserts his will. When he states he would "prefer" not 
to do sometiung he is not willing something to happen, but 
the opposite: ·not willing something to happen. Even ti1e 
(somewhat blind) narrator sees tllis. "Poor fellow! thought I, 
he means no mischief; it is plain he intends no insolence; llis 
aspect sufficiently evinces ti1at Ius eccentricities are invol-
untary" (13 , italics mine). 
Witi1 every step away from expected. "normal" be- · 
havior Bart.leby retreats into himself in a sort of ascetic flight 
from ti1e world. Each time he draws nearer himself he be-
comes more maddening for the lawyer and fue oti1er employ-
ees. We find concentric circles of walls: Wall Street, fue walls 
that surround tlle building, fue walls of the building (and the 
windows), ti1e division between fue lawyer 's side and the 
employee 's side of the office, and the barrier between 
Bartleby's desk and the lawyer. Bartleby is simply erecting 
even more walls - first between llimself and the others, and 
fuen between himself and the physical world, and then, fi-
nally, witilin himself. These increasingly tight barriers show 
Bartleby whittling away at fue temptations of life, ridding 
himself of everytlling but his essential self 
In The World as Will and Representation, Arthur 
Schopenhauer puts forth a conception of human metaphysi-
cal reality timt is eerily sinlilar to the journey fuat Bartleby 
undertakes . Melv ille probably would have liked 
Schopenlwuer- ti1ey're boti1 dark and pessimistic. In order 
to understand how Schopenhauer reaches llis endorsement 
of asceticism I must first preface witi1 a wllirlwind overview 
of Ius philosophy. For Schopenhauer, tllere is one thing-in-
itse/f(the inner content, fue essence of the world): the will to 
life. The will to life is in a state of freedom. Individual beings 
tllat are alive are termed phenomena. "As fue will is fue thing-
in-itself, the inner content, fue essence of the world, but life, 
the visible world, tlle phenomenon, is only tile nlirror of ti1e 
will, this world will accompany ti1e will as inseparably as a 
body is accompanied by its shadow; and if will exists, then 
life, the world, will exist" (Schopenhauer 275). The most im-
portant thing to understand at tllis point is tllat the will to life 
necessitates and detemlines the actions ofti1e phenomenon; 
while tile tiling-in-itself, tile will to life, is freedom, tile .actual 
phenomenal world is determined. A wolf kills prey and eats 
due to the will to life; a flower grows towards sunlight due to 
the will to life, etc. 
Man, like a wolf or a flower or bacteria. is a phenom-
enon. However. unlike these phenomena. man has fue ability 
to reflect upon himself and is in tile unique position of recog-
nizing fue thing-in-itself in himself. 
Like every other part of nature, man is objectivity of 
the will; therefore all that we have said holds good 
of him also. Just as everything in nature has its · 
forces and qualities that definitely react to a definite 
impression, and constitute its character, so man has 
his character, from which the motives call forth his 
actions with necessity. In this way of acting his 
empirical character reveals itself, but in this again is 
revealed his intelligible character, i.e., the will in it 
self, of which he is the detemtined phenomenon 
( 2 8 7 ) 
Given this metaphysical structure it would seem logically 
impossible for human beings to be awarded free will : all will is 
determined by the will to life. There is one loop-hole, though: 
since man is the only phenomenon that is aware of his condi-
tion, he is aware that he is determined. This being the case, 
Schopenhauer argues, there is one path to free action avail-
able: the renunciation of the will to life. Schopenhauer quali-
fies this by stating that "Far from being the denial of the will 
[to life], suicide is the phenomenon of the will 's strong affir-
mation. For denial has its essential nature in the fact that the 
pleasures of life, not its sorrows, are shunned. The suicide 
wills life, and is dissatisfied merely with the conditions on 
which it has come to him" (398). However, through a sort of 
ascetic life one is able to act freely and deny the will to life. 
Thus the freedom which in other respects, as be 
longing to the thing-in-itself, can never show itself 
in the phenomenon, in such a case appears in this 
phenomenon; and by abolishing the essential na-
ture at the root of the phenomenon, whilst the phe-
nomenon itself still continues to exist in time, it brings 
about a contradiction of the phenomenon with it-
self. In just this way, it exhibits the phenomena of 
holiness and self-denial (288). 
One of the reasons, I suspect, that this philosophi-
cal dilenuna is overlooked in "Bartleby" must be due to the 
change in writing style and mood. Gone are the long, high-
flying philosophical diatribes of Moby-Dick and Melville's 
earlier fiction. Instead, we find in "Bartleby" a very subtle 
and exceptionally constructed e.xample of a philosophical idea 
being acted out rather Hum discussed. Bartleby is a fictional 
exemplification of Schopenhauer 's asceticism - compare the 
discussion ofBartleby above to the thrust ofSchopenhauer's 
argument: Bartleby's "preferring not" is a nearly perfect em-
bodiment of the asceticism that goes hand in hand with the 
rejection of the will to life. On the other end of the dialectic 
lies the lawyer who busies himself reading Joseph Priestly 
and Jonathan Edwards on necessity and the will. The lawyer 
declares: "At last I have seen it, I feel it; I penetrate to the 
predestinated purpose of my life. I am content. Others may · 
have loftier parts to enact, but my mission in this world, 
Bartleby, is to furnish you with office room for such period as 
you may see fit to rell).ain" (Melville 26). Unknown to the 
lawyer (and there is much told us of which the lawyer is 
ignorant) , he absolutely is determined according to 
Schopenhauer 's philosophy. 
When the lawyer visits Bartleby in the Tombs 
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Bartleby says something ratl1er curious: "I know you" (31) . A 
few lines later, "I know where I am" (32) . In fact, Bartleby is 
the one person in the entire story qualified to say he knows 
anytlling - he has become aware of his state and engaged in 
the ascetic patl1 to freedom; everybody else is to different 
degrees ( q)eluding themselves. Bartleby is able to look around 
and see tl1ese phenomena surrounding him for what they are, 
something they are not able to do themselves. The greatest 
of iliese liars is ilie lawyer himself. At one point the lawyer 
asks Bartleby why he refuses to write; Bartleby replies, "Do 
you not see the reason for yourself' (21)? This is a very 
ambiguous statement - it can be read two different ways. 
Eitl1er Bartleby is asking whetl1er the reason he has for his 
own resignation from action is not readily apparent, or he is 
asking wheilier the lawyer does not know his own excuse for 
not working. This is the key passage in the story. Instead of 
facing this challenge, the lawyer immediately finds an excuse 
- Bartleby's eyes are clouded and he ob"iously must not be 
able to see. Bartleby's honest asceticism is a challenge to tl1e 
deluded laziness of the lawyer and the lawyer does not know 
how to respond except by this bizarre rationalization for 
Bartleby's actions. 
One must wonder wheilier the attorneys even has 
the Schopenhauerian alternative available to him. Within 
this philosophical system, the very fact that the lawyer is in a 
position of power (which is exercised). thereby makes himself 
powerless to bring about "a contradiction of the phenom-
enon witl1 itself' and thus reach "holiness and self-denial" 
(Schopenhauer 288). The refusal to will on Bartleby's behalf 
enables him to ursurp the favored way of life of the lawyer: "I 
am a man who, from his youth. upwards, has been filled witl1 
a profound conviction tlmt ilie easiest way oflife is ilie best" 
(Melville, 3). So we find that the power of the lawyer, which 
he feels is the way towards the "easiest way oflife", actually 
ends up enslaving bini to the renunciation ofBartleby, who 
refuses any and all means of power. Here Melville presents a 
political critique embedded in tllis pllilosophicallandscape- . 
the critique of power and of Nortl1em capitalism. When 
Bartleby rejects the role he is expected to play within tl1e 
boss/worker relationship he opens the possibility of renun-
ciation: because he refuses to be defined through a symbolic 
econonlic construction (boss/worker) he is left naked and 
free. "The concept of freedom is ilierefore really a negative 
one, since its content is merely the denial of necessity" 
(Schopenhauer 287). Bartleby prefers not to see himself as a 
construct with expected (necessary) responsibilities and ilius 
gains the freedom necessary for Schopenhauer 's ascetic ideal, 
while the lawyer conciously mulls over the issue of free will 
and determinism and willingly continues within tl1e power 
construct. One cannot be free if one is trying to be free : as 
soon as orie begins to justify actions or to-reflect upon a 
supposed freedom, tlley have entered into ~ normative sys-
tem of reason giving, effectively negating freedom and enter-
ing the subject into the realm of necessity (one ought. .. ). 
In an ironic twist that is not uncommon for Melville. 
it is ilie lawyer himself with sight problems. The grubman at 
the Tombs mistakes Bartleby for a forger. The lawyer 
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replies, "No, I was never socially acquainted with any forg-
ers'' (Melville 32). What tl1e lawyer doesn ' t see is tl1at he 
himself is a forger and is surrounded all day by forgers . He 
constructs tl1e text in an attempt to gain sympathy from the 
reader, to try to feel better about himself. The whole point of 
trying to befriend Bartleby was to "lay up in [the lawyer's] 
soul what will eventually prove a sweet morsel for [the 
lawyer 's] conscience" (13) . The lawyer wants to be told how 
great a person he is for acting so hUlllallely with Bartleby, for 
taking the time to sit down and write this account of his life. 
Though he spends a large amount of time watching Bartle by 
stare out tl1e 'vvindow at walls, he never actually sees or un-
derstands what Bartleby is doing. Bartleby, on the otl1er hand, 
understands the lmvyer perfectly well. "He did not look at me 
while I spoke, but kept his glance fixed upon my bust of 
Cicero, which, as I then sat, was directly behind me, some si;x 
inches above my head" (19). Bartleby looks at an inanimate 
object, just as he would if he had lowered his eyes six inches: 
in a strange way he is still looking at the lawyer - Cicero, the 
rhetorician, both already dead. 
And so we are left witl1 two men who are at opposite 
ends of the spectruin. Bartleby recognizes his O'vvn will to life 
and his own lack of freedom and leads himself down the path 
of asceticism towards freedom. The lawyer is completely un-
aware of anything otl1er than surface reality, which, accord-
ing to both Bartleby and Schopenhauer, is rather useless. 
But the problem is iliat neither of these men are actually 
living. Melville (and Schopenhauer) sets up these two as the 
tl1esis and antithesis - but there is no synthesis. In order to 
gain freedom Bartleby needs to cease living; in order to think 
he is living, tl1e lawyer must give up freedom. Neither of 
tl1ese options is adequate. One hundred years later this same 
basic problem is revisited by tl1e absurdists and existential-
ists- wiili one major change: the asserted metaphysical state 
of humans is that of absolute freedom (which can be every 
bit as oppressive as detenninism). 
As I mentioned at the outset, Bartleby anticipates a 
move inade by Camus witl1 his idea ·of Sisyphus as the ab-
surd hero. Sisyphus, too, is an inadequate synti1esis in iliis 
dialectic, but he is closer than either Bartleby or the lawyer. 
Living in a state of existential authenticity and having 
achieved freedom, Sisyphus is a definite step forward. We 
must admire Bartleby for the courage to attempt what he 
does, but surely this slow withering into nothingness is not 
and cannot be ilie solution to this free will/deternlinism dia-
lectic? Sisyphus seems even more radical than Bartleby: 
Sisyphus, fully aware of his freedom, chooses to take the 
rock, to take responsibility. His rock- his burden (his life) -
awaits him. Bartleby, prestmlably, would simply "prefer not" 
to face tltis rock. Ah, but tl1e rock remains! Sisyphus asserts 
a certain dignity absent in Bartleby. "At each of iliose mo-
ments when he leaves the heights and gradually sinks to-
wards the lairs of the gods. he superior to his fate. He is . 
stronger than his rock" (Camus 121). At the very least 
Sisyphus recognizes the rock - his world. his fellow men - and 
has the courage to take responsibility for it, not slipping into 
the ascetic solipsism of Bartleby and Schopenhauer. 
However, despite what Camus has asserted, I have 
a difficult time imagining a truly happy Sisyphus, endlessly 
trudging up that damn mountain wiili his rock, only to come 
back down and begin again .. . endlessly (this "endlessly" is 
important: think just for a second what that word could pos-
sibly mean for hin1!). And so we are still on a quest to find our 
hero, our superman. Or perhaps Schopenhauer is right: "con-
stant suffering is essential to all life" (Schopenhauer 283). 
Maybe Sisyphus need not be happy. 
Ah, Bartleby! Ah, Sisyphus! Ah, humanity! 
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